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 Land Leasing and Debt on Farms: Substitutes or Complements?
   
Theoretically, leasing and debt are thought to be substitutes. This assumes that a lease
payment, which is a fixed obligation like a loan, displaces debt and reduces debt capacity, i.e., if
firms have optimal debt to equity ratios, then, to the extent that it represents “off-balance sheet”
financing, leasing reduces debt capacity.  Ang and Peterson—the seminal work in the
literature—fit Tobit models with 1976 to 1981 data from 600 firms in which a leasing to book
value of equity ratio is the dependent variable and a debt to book value of equity ratio and other
variables are the explanatory variables.  Contrary to expectations, their model results indicate that
leasing and debt are complementary activities.  This study follows the Ang and Peterson
methodology, but utilizes a set of firms which are distinct from those of earlier studies—non-
corporate U.S. commercial farms—to test a land leasing-debt substitution hypothesis.  An
advantage of the land lease example is that by focusing on a single industry—production
agriculture—the problem of potential industry affects is substantially reduced.   In a departure
from earlier studies, the issue of whether the leasing-debt relation is sensitive to heterogenous firm
characteristics and shifting business conditions is examined.
OLS leasing models corrected for heteroskedasticity are fit with 1977 through 1992
Kansas farm-level data in which a leasing ratio is the dependent variable and a debt ratio and other
explanatory variables serve as independent variables.  The models account for fixed time and farm
type effects.   Results strongly indicate that land leasing and debt are substitutes, albeit not dollar
for dollar.  A coefficient estimate of about -0.43 on the total asset full sample model indicates that
on average, leasing decreases by $0.43 for each dollar of debt incurred.  The rate at which farmssubstitute leasing for debt is sensitive to heterogenous farm characteristics and shifting farm
business conditions.  The cross-section sample split results offer some evidence that farms which
are thought to be a priori more credit constrained substitute debt for leasing at a higher rate than
farms which are thought to be a priori less credit constrained. All of the sample split results
however, are consistent, with the notion that in order to push the leasing ratio to higher levels,
leasing must substitute for debt at increasingly higher levels.Land Leasing and Debt on Farms: Substitutes or Complements?
Introduction
Theory indicates that leasing and debt are substitutes (Myers, Dill, Bautista; Ross,
Westerfield, and Jaffe).  This assumes that a lease payment, which is a fixed obligation like a loan,
displaces debt and reduces debt capacity, i.e., if firms have optimal debt to equity ratios, then, to
the extent that leasing represents “off-balance sheet” financing, it reduces debt capacity.  The
leasing-debt substitution hypothesis has been empirically tested in the corporate finance literature
with leasing models fitted with firm-level corporate data.  Ang and Peterson —the seminal work
in the literature—fit tobit models with 1976-81 data from 600 U.S. firms.  Contrary to theory, 
model results indicate that leasing and debt are complementary.  Ang and Petersen suggest that
inefficient capital markets, and differences in tax brackets and the debt between leasing and
nonleasing firms may be responsible for the complementary leasing-debt relation.  
Subsequent studies attribute Ang and Petersen’s unexpected results to several
shortcomings in the study.  Ang and Petersen’s data set contains firms from diverse industries and
therefore diverse debt capacity.  Critics believe that the addition of the non-debt explanatory
variables do not adequately control for diverse debt capacities which may explain the
complimentary relation found between debt and leasing.  A second criticism of Ang and Peterson
is that they fail to include operating leases, focusing exclusively on capital leases.  Graham,
Lemmon, and Schallheim indicate that his may be a serious omission.  Finally, Ang and Peterson
use debt and leasing to equity ratios while other studies normalize debt and leasing with total
assets.  Normalizing by equity and total assets may lead to different results, especially when
leasing and debt comprise a substantial portion of total assets.
Several studies seek to remedy the problems associated with Ang and Peterson’s study.   2
Finucane normalizes leasing and debt with total assets.  Adams and Hardwick use a U.K. data set
in which they define leasing to include operating and financial leases,  and leasing and debt are
normalized by total fixed assets.  Similarly, Marston and Harris, who examine changes in leasing
and debt financing, rather than levels, include both capital and operating assets, and normalize
leasing and debt with total assets. Erickson includes capital and operating assets and accounts for
differences in debt capacity with industry dummy variables.  Like Ang and Peterson, Finucane,
and Adams and Hardwick, find leading and debt to be substitutes, while Marston and Harris, and
Erickson conclude that leasing and debt are substitutes.
The current study further examines the leasing puzzle by examining the substitution of
agricultural land leasing for debt on non-corporate U.S. commercial farms.  Farms are interesting
examples because they are representatives of the vast number of small privately-held firms—a
group which has been ignored in the literature.  In numbers, farms lead all other types of firms and
they lease at high levels.  In 1997 there were 1.9 million U.S. farms and 43% of agricultural
acreage was leased.  Sharpe and Nguyen indicate that credit constraints and leasing are positively
related.  Thus, farms should be prime candidates to lease assets–of which land is the most
important–because farms are capital intensive and under pressure to expand due to ever
expanding economies of scale, and farms are thought to have limited borrowing capacity and
access to equity markets (Bierlen and Featherstone). 
The study remedies several of the shortcomings found in Ang and Peterson.  By  focusing
on a single industry—U.S. production agriculture—in a single state, the problem of divergent
debt capacities should be greatly reduced.  To further account for divergent dept capacity, the
model accounts for heterogeneous farm enterprises following Erickson. The study accounts for
the bulk of farm leasing activity–land leasing.  A second form of leasing–equipment and machinery3
2See Langemeier for a description of the raw KFMA farm variables.
3Since several variables are normalized by assets, the inclusion of these farms creates problems associated
with outliers.
4Total assets refers to owned assets plus leased land.
capital leases–is relatively unimportant.  In a departure from previous studies, following the credit
constraint literature, separate leasing models are estimated for sets of farms with differential
access to credit (see, e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen;  Gilchrist and Himmelberg; and Bierlen
and Featherstone.  Farms with less access to credit due to greater asymmetry of information and
agency problem should substitute leasing for debt at higher rates. 
Farm Sample
The data consist of  417 Kansas farms which were continuously enrolled in the Kansas
Farm Management Association (KFMA) program from 1973 through 1992.
2   The group of 417
farms is not a random sample of Kansas farms because KFMA farms tend to be larger than non-
KFMA farms and participation is voluntary.  Because of the relatively large size of KFMA farms,
the results of this study are considered to be representative of commercial or full-time operator 
farms.  Eight farms are dropped from the sample because of low equity levels, leaving 409 farms
in the sample.
3 
1992 leasing and debt ratio means are presented in Table 1 for the 409 Kansas farms.  The
ratios are estimated for ‘total assets’ and ‘land assets.’  The denominators in the total asset ratios
include all owned and leased assets and debt is total debt.   The denominators in the land asset
ratios include owned and leased land assets and debt is long-term debt.  Unlike Compustat firms,
the preponderance of the farms lease.  Land is leased in 6044 of 6544 farm-years or, in over
92.3% of farm-years.  Leased land is an important component of the typical asset portfolio,
comprising 39.3% of total assets and 53.1% of  land assets.
4   As expected, the leasing to total4
5The quartiles in the total assets section are based on the leasing to total asset ratio and in the land assets
section on the leasing to land assets ratio.
asset ratio is the highest for crop farms at 0.439.  Dairy farms have the lowest leasing to total
asset ratio at 0.277.   Mean debt levels are moderate.  The mean debt to owned asset ratio is
0.291 and the mean debt to total asset ratio is 0.166.
The means of the leasing and debt to total asset ratios and the means of the leasing and
debt to land asset ratios by leasing quartiles indicate that leasing and debt are substitutes.
5  While
the mean leasing to total asset ratio increases monotonically from 0.111 in the first quartile to
0.815 in the fourth quartile, the mean debt to total asset ratio monotonically falls from  0.201 in
the first quartile to 0.089 in the fourth quartile.  However, the mean debt to owned asset ratio
monotonically increases in moving from the first to fourth quartiles.  The relationships are similar
for the land asset ratios found in the bottom half of the table.    
Leasing Model 
Following the literature, the relation between the leasing and debt ratios is defined as:
DRo = DRl + "LRl (1)
where, DRo is the debt to total asset ratio of a farm which owns all of its land, DRl  is the debt to
total asset ratio and LRl is the value of leased land to total asset ratio of a similar farm which
leases some or all of its land, and " is the extent to which leasing substitutes for (or complements)
debt or the debt to lease displacement ratio.  If leasing substitutes for debt dollar for dollar, the
testable hypothesis is that the debt to lease displacement ratio is equal to one.  If  leasing and debt
are substitutes, but not on a dollar for dollar basis, then the debt to lease displacement ratio
should be strictly positive, but less than one.  Klein, Crawford, and Alchian indicate that leased
assets are riskier than owned assets—increasing bankruptcy and liquidity costs—thus pushing the5
6There are 13 farm types.  These include dryland cash crop, irrigated cash crop, cow-sheep herd, dairy,
cattle backgrounding, cattle feeding, cashcrop/cattle backgrounding, hog production, cash crop/cows-sheep,
general farm, cash crop/hog production, cash crop/cattle finishing, and cattle finishing/hog production. In specialty
farms at least 70% of labor is utilized in that specialty area.  In crop/livestock farms at least 35% of labor is used in
livestock production and 35% in crop production.  General farms do not fit either of these two criteria.
displacement ratio beyond one.  A negative debt to lease displacement ratio, of course, indicates
that leasing and debt are complementary.
Equation (1) can be rewritten as:
DRo = DRl + "LRl = f(x1, x2, ..., xk), (2)
where f(·) is a function of lessee explanatory variables which control for debt capacity.  Ignoring
the DRo term which is unknown, subtracting DRl from both sides and dividing through by "
results in the general form of the estimable model of interest: 
  LRl = -(1/")DRl + (1/")f(x1, x2, ..., xk) (3)
Equation (3) is a non-structural model developed by Ang and Peterson with use by subsequent
leasing-debt substitution studies.  Relying on past studies with appropriate changes to agriculture
and following equation (3), the actual econometric model to be estimated for farm i at time t is:
LRit = (1DRit + (2SIZEit + (3AGEit + (4LIVESTOCKit + (5PROFITit + (4)
           (6LIQUIDITYit + *i + µt + ,it
where, 
LR = beginning period leasing to asset ratio;
DR = beginning period debt to asset ratio;
SIZE = beginning period market value of total assets;
AGE = beginning period age of the principal operator;
LIVESTOCK = beginning period market value of feeder livestock to total inventories;
PROFIT = return on capital assets in the previous year;
LIQUIDITY = beginning period current ratio;
* = is a vector of dummy variables to capture fixed farm type effects; and
µ = is a vector of dummy variables to capture fixed time effects.
6
SIZE, AGE, LIVESTOCK, PROFIT, and LIQUIDITY are added to the model to control6
7Due to the low number of farms which do not lease (7.6%), the differences in estimate values fromTobit 
are likely negligible.  Moreover, attempts to use Tobit with a correction for heteroskedasticity were unsuccessful
because of convergence difficulties.  
for debt capacity.  The expected sign on the SIZE coefficient estimate is indeterminate.  The
credit constraint literature indicates that larger firms have lower asymmetry of information
problems and thus are able to borrow at higher levels.  This indicates that the lease ratio is
inversely related to size.    However, USDA (1992) statistics indicate that there is a positive
relation between total assets and leasing.  The expected sign on AGE is negative because it is
thought that over a farmer’s life cycle the land portfolio is made up of ever increasing percentages
of owned land while the percentage of leased land decreases.  A priori we are uncertain about the
sign on the LIVESTOCK coefficient estimate.  The LIVESTOCK coefficient may be negative
because livestock farms by their nature are less land intensive than crop farms, thus leased land
should be a smaller portion of their total asset portfolio than crop farms.  However, because
livestock production typically needs high levels of short-term borrowing, livestock farms may
need to lease more land relative to crop farms in order to stay within their borrowing limits.  The
expected signs of the PROFIT and LIQUIDITY signs are indeterminate.  If leasing produces
higher cash flows than owning land, PROFIT and LIQUIDITY should increase with leasing
levels.  However, farms with higher cash flows, and thus more internal funds, should be better
able to purchase land.    
Full Sample Model Results
Full-sample OLS leasing model coefficient estimates are reported for in table 2.
7  Two-
sided coefficient p-values are reported in parenthesis.   To correct for potential heteroskedasticty,
common in panel data, the multiplicative heteroskedasticty approach of Harvey (1976) is
followed.  All models are estimated with time and farm type dummy variables whose coefficient7
estimates are not reported due to space considerations.
The DR coefficient estimate is negative and highly significant.  This supports the
hypothesis that leasing and debt are substitutes.  The DR coefficient estimates of -0.43 indicates
that for each dollar increase in debt there is a $0.43 decrease in the value of leased land.  That the
DR coefficient estimate is less than 1 in absolute value is consistent with the notion leasing does
not have to be reduced dollar for dollar with debt because leasing cash flows better than owning,
the cost of leasing is responsive to market conditions, and unprofitable land leases can be
dropped. 
 The signs of the non-DR coefficient estimates are as expected.  The coefficient estimate
on AGE is negative and significant which supports the life cycle theory that farmers replace leased
land with owned land as they age.  The SIZE coefficient estimate is positive and highly significant
which indicates that dependence on leasing increases with total assets.  This is contrary to
Branson and Erickson who find support for the credit constraint hypothesis.  The signs on firm
size (total assets) in Ang and Peterson’s models are not consistent.  However, in their study, the
signs on firm size are negative in all instances in which the coefficient estimates are statistically
significant.   Here, the negative signs on SIZE support the notion that leasing plays a key role in
increasing the size of productive assets.  The LIVESTOCK coefficient estimates are positive and
statistically significant.  This supports the hypothesis that livestock farms are more reliant on
leasing than crop farms because of the heavy investment in and borrowing needs of livestock.  
The PROFIT and LIQUIDITY estimates are positive and statistically significant.  The positive
coefficient estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that operators choose to lease because it
increases cash flow levels.  The positive coefficients estimates on PROFIT are inconsistent with
Ang and Peterson, and Branson, who find higher levels of leasing to be associated with lower8
profitability levels.  The positive coefficient estimates on LIQUIDITY are consistent with the
findings of Ang and Peterson, but contrary to Branson.
Model Results by Farm Characteristics
In order to determine the robustness of the basic results, models are estimated for cross-
sectional subsets of the Kansas farm panel data set following the recent credit constraint literature 
The data are split into cross-sectional groupings based on credit constraints.  Credit constraints
are typically attributed to asymmetry of information between borrowers and lenders, and financial
hierarchies in which internal funds are preferred to either outside debt or equity.  Farms are
thought to be especially susceptible to credit constraints because: 1) they are capital intensive
relative to their sales and cash flow levels, 2) farm assets are undiversified and inflexible—held
almost exclusively in farm-specific capital, especially agricultural land, 3) debt is important as a
source of investment funds due to a lack of well-developed equity markets, and 4) the U.S. farm
economy is known to suffer from period bouts of debt deflation.
Farms are split into more and less credit constrained  groups according to owned equity,
total operating assets, the importance of livestock, and the age of the principal farm operator. 
Farms are first ordered by their pre-sample 1976 levels of the four cross-sectional criteria.  In
order to increase the diversity between the two groupings, following Bierlen et al., the middle
one-third of the farms are deleted and separate models for the upper and lower one-third of the
farms using 1977-92 data are estimated. 
Model coefficient estimates are reported in table 2 by cross-sectional sample.  Comments
will focus on the DR coefficient estimates.  The non-DR coefficient estimates are similar to the
full sample models.   Consistent with the full sample results, all DR coefficient estimates are
negative and highly statistically significant.  This indicates that the leasing-debt substitution9
relationship holds across farms with heterogenous characteristics.
A priori we hypothesize that the absolute value of the DR coefficient estimate will be
larger (in absolute value) for farms with more severe credit constraint problems, i.e., more credit
constrained farms would have to reduce their land leasing obligations at a higher rate than less
severely credit constrained farms in order to take on additional debt.  Thus, it is expected that low
equity and small farms will be more credit constrained than high equity and large farms because
they have lower collateral and cash flow levels to back up their borrowing.  Because livestock
farms frequently purchase feeder livestock, feed, and other livestock supplies, they are more
dependent on short-term borrowing and hold a higher percentage of their loan portfolio in short-
term notes than crop farms.  The risk of bankruptcy is higher in the livestock than the crop sector
because livestock prices are cyclical with debt depreciation more frequent in the livestock than the
crop sector.  Thus, livestock farms should be relatively more credit constrained than crop farms. 
Finally, older operators should be less credit constrained than young operators because they have
longer standing relations with their lenders, greater equity accumulations, and generally better
financial variables.   However, young operators are better educated and may be more adept at
demonstrating credit worthiness to lenders.
Estimated DR coefficients for low and high equity farms, and young and old operators are
consistent with expectations.  The DR coefficients for the small and large, and the crop and
livestock farms are contrary to expectations.  Thus, support for the notion that credit constraints
determine the rate of substitution between leasing and debt is weak.  All of the sample split results
however, are consistent, with the notion that in order to push the leasing ratio to higher levels,
leasing must substitute for debt at increasingly higher levels.10
Concluding Remarks
Theoretically, leasing and debt are thought to be substitutes. This assumes that a lease
payment, which is a fixed obligation like a loan, displaces debt and reduces debt capacity, i.e., if
firms have optimal debt to equity ratios, then, to the extent that it represents “off-balance sheet”
financing, leasing reduces debt capacity.   This study follows the Ang and Peterson methodology,
but utilizes a set of firms which are distinct from those of earlier studies—non-corporate U.S.
commercial farms—to test a land leasing-debt substitution hypothesis. 
OLS leasing models corrected for heteroskedasticity are fit with 1977-92 Kansas farm-
level data in which a leasing ratio is the dependent variable and a debt ratio and explanatory
variables which control for debt capacity serve as independent variables.  The models account for
fixed time and farm type effects.  Results strongly indicate that land leasing and debt are
substitutes, albeit not dollar for dollar.  A coefficient estimate of about -0.43 on the total asset full
sample model indicates that on average, leasing decreases by $0.43 for each dollar of debt
incurred.  The debt ratio coefficient estimate is sensitive to heterogenous farm characteristics. 
The cross-section sample split results offers some support that farms which are thought to be a
priori more credit constrained substitute debt for leasing at a higher rate than farms which are
thought to be a priori less credit constrained.  All of the sample split results however, are
consistent, with the notion that in order to push the leasing ratio to higher levels, leasing must
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix: Variable Definitions and Sample Splits
Leasing ratio-The ratio of the market value of leased land to the market value of total operating
assets.
Total operating assets-The market value of owned assets plus the market value of leased land.
Owned Assets-The sum of the market value of end of year inventories, owned land, stock of
motor vehicles and machinery, breeding livestock, non-residential buildings, and cash on hand. 
The depreciable capital stock of equipment and machinery is built up using the perpetual inventory
method (see Bierlen and Featherstone).  
Value of owned and leased land-Each farm reports the number of owned and leased acres of
irrigated crop land, non-irrigated crop land, and pasture. The Kansas Board of Agriculture
(Schlender) reports annual per acre land values for irrigated crop land, non-irrigated crop land,
and pasture land for nine statistical districts.  Land values are estimated by multiplying reported
acreage by the district price and summing across land types.
Total debt ratio-Total debt to owned assets.
Long-term debt ratio-The ratio of long-term debt to the market value of owned land and14
buildings.  Long-term debts are those loans with a maturity over seven years (Langemeier).
Current ratio-The ratio of the market value of ending year current assets to current loans. 
Current assets include inventories of crops, feeding livestock, animal feed, livestock and crop
supplies, and fuel and oil, and cash on hand.
Age- The age of the principal farm operator in years.
Profit-The ratio of cash flow to the market value of owned capital assets. Cash flow is net income
(not including interest and taxes as expenses).  Owned capital assets include real estate, breeding
livestock, and machinery and equipment.    
Sample Splits- Low equity farms are the lower one-third of 409 Kansas farms in which 1976
equity is < $145,000.  High equity farms are the upper one-third of 409 Kansas farms in which
1976 equity is > $274,750. Small
 asset farms are the lower one-third of 409 Kansas farms in
which 1976 owned assets are < $309,000.  Large asset farms are the upper one-third of 409
Kansas farms in which 1976 owned assets are > $495,700.  Crop farms are the lower one-third of
409 Kansas farms in which 1976 feeder livestock to total inventory ratios are < 0.145.  Livestock
farms are the upper one-third of 409 Kansas farms in which 1976 feeder livestock to total
inventory ratios are > 0.461.  Young operator farms are the lower one-third of 409 Kansas farms
in which 1976 operator ages are < 42.  Old operator farms are the upper one-third of 409 Kansas
farms in which 1976 operator ages are > 50.5.  15
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